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a particular case, Rajapaksa v. Sri Lanka, in 2006 it actually
found Sri Lanka to be in violation, apparently for having failed
its duty to prosecute and punish the perpetrator of torture under
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.6 But again, there’s
nothing actually written into the text of the Covenant itself about
criminalization or prosecution, so some states might say “thank
you esteemed experts but we respectfully disagree with you,”
leaving matters at a sort of impasse.
Customary international law is another possible source,
although most people think that in terms of the obligation to
criminalize and punish and so on, customary international law
is permissive rather than mandatory. But the case of Hissène
Habré, the former President of Chad, who is accused of crimes
against humanity – including torture – in Chad, is of interest. He
is currently under house arrest in Senegal, and Belgium has been
seeking to have him extradited or prosecuted for some time.
Belgium has now filed an application to the International Court
of Justice, against Senegal, relying in part on customary international law, arguing that it actually poses mandatory obligations
to either prosecute or extradite;7 however, they also rely on the
explicit provisions of the Convention against Torture, which
will in fact form the basis for the rest of my remarks.
The UN Convention against Torture is the most explicit and
detailed international code or source for the obligation to criminalize torture.8 It expressly addresses both war and peace time.9
It has some 146 state parties. The Convention itself does not
specifically say that there must be a distinct offense or definition
named “torture” in domestic law, but certainly the Committee
has consistently, in dozens and dozens of instances, stated that
it interprets the Convention as requiring that there must indeed
be a separate definition, a separate offense, of torture in national
law.10 So it is not sufficient that any act of torture might be
covered by a general offense of “assault” under national law, as
many countries argue. There is very good reason to accept the
Committee’s interpretation of the Convention. First of all, as I
will discuss in a moment, the Convention specifically requires
each state to eliminate certain defenses in respect of any act of
torture, defenses that might otherwise ordinarily apply to all
offenses in the state’s criminal code; how could a state make
such defenses inapplicable to every act of torture if “torture” is
not defined in national law? Second, the Convention requires that
an appropriate sentencing range be available in respect of acts of
torture;11 again, how is a state to ensure an appropriate sentencing range for all acts of torture if “torture” is not mentioned in
its criminal code? Third, as we will see, the Convention requires
states to establish international, potentially global, jurisdiction
over acts of torture, and very few if any countries have interna-
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Committee Against Torture under relevant provisions of the
UN Convention,1 as well as excerpts from the other relevant
jurisprudence and treaties to which I will be referring.
The topics I will address are: first, where does the obligation
to make torture a specific offense in domestic law come from?
Second, what is the scope of jurisdiction that has to be established for that offense in domestic law? Third, a description of
ancillary obligations designed to ensure that torture is criminalized in practice, including mandatory investigation and arrest, as
well as prosecution and extradition.
In terms of the obligation itself, and the sources of the obligation, the first and perhaps oldest source is the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. As you probably know, each of the Geneva
Conventions includes provisions on “grave breaches.”2 Among
other things, “torture” and “inhuman treatment” of prisoners,
and “unlawful confinement” of civilians, are covered by those
grave breaches provisions. The Conventions require that alleged
perpetrators of “grave breaches” be searched for by the state,
and then (in a manner that, as we will see, is similar to that eventually enacted for “torture” under the UN Convention against
Torture) requires that they are either prosecuted or extradited.
On the plus side, the Geneva Conventions have essentially
been ratified by every country in the world. So in that sense, they
are a good source. On the other hand, on their face, the grave
breaches provisions only apply to international armed conflicts.
Now, as regards non-international armed conflicts – whether as
interpreted under U.S. Supreme Court decisions in this country
or otherwise – there are other arguments for criminalization of
torture under international humanitarian law in those contexts.3
But the other major limitation is that on its face, again, those
grave breaches provisions apply only to the “protected persons” under each Convention, and you have to look under the
Convention for the definition.4 So, as a source of obligation,
the Geneva Conventions do not apply all the time, everywhere,
and they do not necessarily apply to everyone.
The relevant part of Article 7 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights simply states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.” The Human Rights Committee established under
the treaty has, however, interpreted that provision as incorporating a requirement to bring perpetrators to justice.5 In fact, in
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Convention, and indeed to comply with the absoluteness of the
prohibition that applies more generally under customary international law. Article 2(3) of the Convention also specifically says
that “[a]n order from a superior officer or a public authority may
not be invoked as a justification of torture.” Such defenses are
often set out more generally under national laws, for instance to
allow legitimate (proportionate and necessary) use of force by
law enforcement officials which otherwise might constitute an
assault. Any such defenses must again somehow be made inapplicable to torture in national law.
Article 5 of the Convention requires that states establish in
national law several bases of jurisdiction over acts of torture [as
well as attempt, complicity and participation]. First, territorial
jurisdiction: all acts of torture carried out on the State’s territory must be covered by national criminal law. The article also
requires that extraterritorial jurisdiction be established on several
possible grounds. Thus, all acts of torture, carried out anywhere,
must be covered by a state’s criminal law if the perpetrator is
a national of the state; so, in the case of an American offender
accused in respect of acts committed in another country, indeed
even an American astronaut on the moon who tortures another
astronaut, U.S. criminal law must be made to apply to that act.
Finally, if an alleged offender of whatever nationality comes into
a state’s territory, and is not extradited to another state, the state
must be able to exercise criminal jurisdiction over acts of torture
of which he or she is accused, regardless of where the alleged
acts took place or against whom they were perpetrated.17
It is not enough that states enable such jurisdiction in
national law; the Convention requires specific actions that
must take place when particular instances arise. For instance, if
someone is on the state’s territory who is accused of an act of
torture, under Article 6 the state is required to take the individual
into custody or otherwise to ensure his or her presence pending
investigation. (Interestingly, in the International Court of Justice
application mentioned earlier, Belgium is asking the Court to
order provisional measures, similar to an interim injunction,
that Senegal is bound to ensure that Habré is kept under house
arrest or otherwise unable to escape from the country.) Having
taken the person into custody, the state is then required to begin
inquiring into the facts, and to notify and report promptly the
results to the state or states whose territories or nationals may
be involved. Again, these obligations apply not only vis-à-vis a
person accused of actually inflicting the pain and suffering, but
also to anyone who was involved through complicity or participation. At the heart of this scheme, which is aimed at ensuring
that there is “no safe haven” anywhere in the world for torturers,
is an express obligation in Article 7 to prosecute or extradite the
alleged offender. It is a strictly either/or proposition with only
two possibilities: either the case is submitted for prosecution by
the state’s own authorities, or (assuming another state is seeking
extradition) the person is extradited for prosecution elsewhere.
(In its application to the International Court of Justice, Belgium is
relying expressly on Articles 5 and 7 in its case against Senegal,
arguing Senegal is obliged under the Convention against
Torture to either prosecute this person or send him to Belgium
for prosecution and, as Senegal has done neither, Belgium
argues it has violated its obligations under the Convention.)

tional, global jurisdiction over simple assault offenses, so again
how is a state going clearly to establish that jurisdiction without
a definition of “torture” under its laws.
The Committee does not necessarily expect states to enact
exactly the definition that appears in Article 1 of the Convention
verbatim into domestic laws, but any national law definition
must cover at minimum all acts covered by the Convention
definition.12 The elements of any such definition were mentioned by Professor Nowak; key among them are severe pain
and suffering whether physical or mental, inflicted for certain purposes set out in the Convention. The definition in the
Convention excludes “pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions,” but “lawful”
in this context is generally interpreted to mean lawful under
international law.13 So a state cannot say “well, that particular
type of treatment or punishment is actually provided for in our
national laws, and therefore excluded from the definition of the
Convention, and therefore not a problem.” To allow otherwise
would obviously completely undermine the purpose and objective of the treaty, for one thing. Further, if one refers to the UN
General Assembly’s 1975 Declaration on Torture, it contained
a similar exclusion, but one which more precisely referred to
“lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.”14 This is probably the best way to understand, what the Convention meant to
exclude by referring to “lawful sanctions,” that there may be, for
instance, severe mental pain and suffering inherent in the simple
fact of being incarcerated, but if the incarceration is fully in
compliance with human rights standards then such punishment
is excluded from the definition.15
Article 4(1) of the Convention specifically requires not only
that each state criminalize every “act of torture” in the sense
of the person who actually inflicts the pain and suffering, but
also that any “attempt to commit torture” and any act “by any
person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture”
be included. The concepts of “complicity” and “participation”
often already exist in national laws, though they may be called
“aiding or abetting” or “accessory” or other terms. Once again,
however, whatever its name, the concept of “attempt,” “complicity” and “participation” applied at the national level must
cover at least everything that is meant by the treaty itself when it
uses those words. By way of illustration, several cases from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia help
to give a sense of the breadth of such concepts (therein discussed
in terms of “co-perpetration” and “aiding and abetting”) under
international law.16
In terms of the absoluteness of the prohibition of torture,
including at the national level, Article 2(2) of the Convention
provides that “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever .  .  .
may be invoked as a justification of torture” and expressly
including “a state of war or a threat of war, internal political
instability or any other public emergency.” Many national criminal codes will have general defenses of necessity, or defense
of self, defense of others, and so on, which might ordinarily
apply in respect of other crimes in situations of duress. Clearly
any such defenses must somehow be made inapplicable in
national law to the offense of torture in order to comply with the
16
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Note that the Convention does not on its face state that every
case must ultimately be brought to trial and the person convicted; Article 7 requires that the state “submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,” and that
those authorities “shall take their decision in the same manner as
in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the
law of that State.” In other words, in deciding whether to take
forward the case for prosecution, the authorities cannot apply
a lower standard, or a higher standard, of evidence, and they
should not allow political or other improper criteria to influence
their decision. The Convention does not dispense with the need
for a proper criminal case;18 admissible evidence is required,
one shouldn’t expect that simply providing newspaper reports,
or say a book, to the authorities will trigger an obligation to
prosecute.19
All of this applies to every one of the 146 countries who is a
party to the Convention. As the conference is taking place in the
United States, however, I will make a few specific observations.
Obviously the Executive Orders issued by President Obama are
very positive and encouraging on a going-forward basis, but
problems remain that have to be addressed, some of which are
probably obvious to you at this point in my presentation.
First, at the time that the United States ratified the Convention, the Senate stated certain “understandings” about how it
interprets the definition in Article 1 of the Convention, including the words “severe mental pain and suffering.”20 And those
understandings have found their way into the definition of
torture under U.S. criminal law.21 It would seem that has not
changed with the Executive Order, as we are talking about
Congressional legislation.
Second, a statutory defense was slipped into the 2005
Detainee Treatment Act, on “Protection of United States Gov
ernment Personnel Engaged in Authorized Interrogations”
[section 1004]. It applies to U.S. personnel who face civil or
criminal proceedings arising out of their involvement in “spe-

cific operational practices” that involved “detention and interrogation of aliens” who the executive believed were “engaged
in or associated with international terrorist activity.” It seems to
be a type of “ignorance of the law” or “due diligence” defense,
making it a defense for any accused who establishes that he or
she “did not know that the practices were unlawful and a person
of ordinary sense and understanding would not know the practices were unlawful,” and that “[g]ood faith reliance on advice of
counsel should be an important factor, among others, to consider
in assessing whether a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the practices to be unlawful.” Under the
Convention, there is little if any room for any defense of due
diligence or ignorance of the law when it comes to torture. This
may be especially so given that, so far as I understand, the reason that Congress felt it needed to enact the specific provision is
because similar defenses do not exist under U.S. law in respect
of other similarly serious criminal offenses.
Finally we had the admissions before Congress by state
officials during the previous administration that indeed some
individuals were subjected to water-boarding (at the same time
denying that it constituted torture under U.S. law).22 We also
have the admission of the Convening Authority at Guantánamo
Detention Center that one of the Military Commission cases
was stopped because she concluded that the person had been
tortured.23 As I have explained, under the Convention once you
have – as in these cases – public acknowledgements of acts of
torture, certain machinery of criminal investigation and prosecution is certainly supposed to start operating. Now, perhaps
it is operating behind closed doors and we are not aware of it,
but weeks have gone by without further comment. We must
add this, then, to the list of questions that must continue to be
asked about the consistency of U.S. law and practice with its
international obligations regarding “torture as a specific criminal
offence in domestic laws.” Thank you. 		
HRB

Endnotes: Torture as a Specific Criminal Offense in Domestic Laws
1

4

Nigel Rodley and Matt Pollard, “Criminalisation of Torture: State
Obligations under the United Nations Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”
[2006] 2 European Human Rights Law Review 115-141.

E.g. Third Geneva Convention, article 4; Fourth Geneva
Convention, article 4. However, note the ICRC Commentary to the
Fourth Convention (ICRC: Geneva, 1958), pp 50-51, especially:
“Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law; he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by
the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention,
or again, a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces
who is covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate
status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.”

2

Third Geneva Convention, 1949 (Prisoners of War), articles 129,
130, 131, and Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949 (Civilians), articles
146, 147, 148; UN Convention against Torture (1984), articles 1, 2
and 4 to 7.

3

See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
article 8(2)(c); Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck,
Customary International Humanitarian Law (ICRC/Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 2005); Eve La Haye, War Crimes in
Internal Armed Conflicts (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
2008).

5

See Human Rights Committee, “General Comment no. 31: Nature
of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the
Covenant,” UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004),
para 18.

17

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 6
6

Human Rights Committee, Lalith Rajapakse v. Sri Lanka, decision of 14 July 2006, UN Doc CCPR/C/87/D/1250/2004 (26 July
2006), para. 9.3 [referring to “a duty” to “investigate thoroughly”
and to “prosecute and punish those held responsible for such violations”], as well as paras 9.4 and 9.5 [finding a violation of article
7 in combination with article 2(3) on the obligation to provide an
effective remedy].

19

7 Application Instituting Proceedings, Belgium v. Senegal
(16 February 2009), <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/15054.
pdf>, accessed 12 March 2009.

20

Note, though, that evidence that might not suffice to support
prosecution will very often if not always trigger an obligation to
investigate the allegations. Article 12 of the Convention states:
“Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed
to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in
any territory under its jurisdiction.”
“. . . with reference to Article 1, the United States understands
that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and
that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm
caused by or resulting from: (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application,
of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be
subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality”:
U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings, Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990),
reproduced at < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/tortres.
html> accessed 12 March 2009.

8 Article 4(1) requires in part: “Each State Party shall ensure that
all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law.” “Torture”
is defined in article 1 of the Convention (see further discussion
below).
9
10

See articles 2(2) and 4(1).
See Rodley and Pollard, supra n. 1, at 118-120.

11

Article 4(2) provides: “Each State Party shall make these
offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into
account their grave nature.”
12

Article 1 defines torture to mean “any act by which severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed,
or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” However, this definition is specified to be without prejudice to
“any international instrument or national legislation which does or
may contain provisions of wider application”: article 1(2).
13

21

See the extraterritorial torture offence established by 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340 and 2340A. The UN Committee Against Torture, established under the Convention, has apparently concluded that U.S.
law is not consistent with the Convention for this, among other,
reasons [including the absence of a torture offence generally applicable within the United States]. See the Concluding Observations
of the Committee in 2006 [UN Doc CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (25 July
2006)]: “The State party should ensure that acts of psychological
torture, prohibited by the Convention, are not limited to ‘prolonged
mental harm’ as set out in the State party’s understandings lodged
at the time of ratification of the Convention, but constitute a wider
category of acts, which cause severe mental suffering, irrespective of their prolongation or its duration.” See also its Concluding
Observations in 2000 [UN Doc A/55/44 (15 May 2000)], paras.
179(a) and 180(a).

See Rodley and Pollard, supra n. 1, at 120-122.

14

Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 3452 (XXX) of 9 December 1975, article 1(1).
15

See Rodley and Pollard, supra n. 1, at 121.

16 Prosecutor v. Furundžija (“Lašva Valley”), Case no. IT-9517/1, Appeal Judgment 21 July 2001, paras 115-121; Prosecutor v.
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